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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK JOESPH SERY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 85G333-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, after a trial 
in the Third District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1986). 
STM*EMENT_OF_ISSDE^ 
1. Under Utah law, can a defendant enter a conditional 
plea of guilty and preserve the right to appeal a trial court's 
pre-trial ruling? 
2. Was the detention of defendant and his luggage 
outside the airport an investigatory stop? 
3. Did the officers have reasonable suspicion to 
detain defendant and his luggage? 
STATEMENT_OF_.THE_.CASE 
Defendant, Mark Sery, was charge^ with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a)(i) (Supp. 1985). 
After losing a motion to suppress defendant pled no contest and 
was found guilty as charged. The court sentenced defendant to a 
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. The 
sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on probation. The 
trial court subsequently issued a certificate of probable cause, 
STAT^ENT_pF_THE_FACTS 
On May 22, 1981, William Pearson, a police officer from 
Florida, was in Salt Lake City conducting a training seminar on 
airport narcotics interdiction techniques for the Salt Lake 
Police department (R. 38). As a part of this seminar, Sergeant 
Pearson and several other officers observed the arrival of Delta 
Airlines flight #565 from Florida (R. 39). 
One of the passengers, defendant, was carrying a blue 
vinyl suitcase and appeared very nervous as he deplaned (R. 40). 
Once off the plane he stopped momentarily, looked nervously 
around while the other passengers passed him and then proceeded 
up the concourse (R. 40). When he came to a coffee shop he again 
stopped and nervously looked around before entering and 
purchasing a drink (R. 40). He then walked into a partitioned 
phone area, picked up a phone, but did not deposit any money or 
make any calls (R. 79). While in the phone area, he stood up 
twice and looked over the booth at the trailing officers (R. 40, 
79) . Finally, he hung up the phone and re-entered the concourse 
in an indirect, awkward manner (R. 42). 
The officers then approached defendant, presented 
identification, and asked defendant if they could speak with him 
(R. 42). He agreed (R. 42), and upon request presented his 
ticket, stating that the name on the ticket "Sid Sellow" was not 
his name (R. 43), and that the airlines had "made a mistake" (R. 
43). He further stated that he did not have any other 
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identification. When asked if he would consent to a search of 
his suitcase, he refused (R. 43)• The officers then told 
defendant that he was free to leave (R. 43). 
Defendant then took the escalator downstairs and waited 
in the baggage area several minutes (R. 44). Thereafter, he 
walked out of the terminal, and then re-entered (R. 44). 
Meanwhile, Sgt. Pearson obtained a telephone number 
given by defendant to the airline. Upon falling the number he 
learned that it was not a working number and had been changed to 
an unpublished number (R. 45). He then requested another officer 
to obtain a dog trained in narcotics detection (R. 49) which 
arrived at noon (R. 50). 
Shortly after the dog arrived, Sgt. Pearson approached 
defendant outside the terminal and asked if he would consent to a 
sniff by the dog of his bag (R. 51). The defendant declined, and 
Sgt. Pearson advised him that he and his bag were being detained 
so that his bag could be presented to the dog (R. 51). Defendant 
was then advised of the procedure (R. 51), and the bag was taken 
behind the counter and placed in a lineup with several other bags 
(R. 52). The dog gave a "positive alert,rt to the bag, 
indicating the presence of illicit drugs (R. 53). Defendant and 
his bag were detained for approximately five minutes but in no 
event longer than fifteen minutes (R. 88). One of the officers 
returned to the concourse, informed defendant of the results of 
the test, and arrested him (R. 83)• Once the bag was opened 
pursuant to a search warrant, 3 bags of cocaine were found (R. 
84) . Defense counsel did not contest that at the point the dog 
sniffed the bag the State had probable cause (R. 55). 
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Defendant was subsequently charged with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985). 
Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized 
from him. At the close of the suppression hearing the trial 
court denied defendant's motion and the following transaction 
occurred: 
MS. JENNINGS: Your Honor, in view of that 
ruling, we're prepared at this time to enter 
a conditional plea of no contest to the 
charges, 
I would like to have the opportunity to 
appeal on the motion, and Mr. Morgan and I 
decided, in view of the Utah Supreme Court's 
latest decision in the Kay case where they 
did allow for conditional pleas, that Mr. 
Sery can enter a plea on the condition that 
should the Supreme Court find this motion 
should have been granted, he can withdraw the 
plea. 
I think this may be a new thing to do, 
but I think it would probably help judicial 
administration. There's no sense in going 
through a trial on facts such as this and 
would ask the Court to go along with it. I 
have explained it to Mr. Sery, he understands 
it, and he would like to get on with the 
process rather than wait around for a trial. 
MR. MORGAN: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to enter the plea at this time 
or at 2:00? 
(R. 115). Based upon the above transaction defendant entered a 
plea of no contest to the charge. 
Defendant was subsequently convicted of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985). 
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Under Utah law, once a defendant enters a plea of 
guilty, it is a final judgment and no issues exist for purposes 
of appeal other than the intelligence or voluntariness of the 
plea. Siste_;v._Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1|986) should be limited 
to its facts and should not be extended to allow conditional 
pleas in all situations. Thus, once defendant pled guilty, he 
waived all pre-trial rulings for purposes of appeal. 
The detention of defendant and his luggage was an 
investigatory stop justified by reasonable suspicion. The nature 
and scope of the detention was minimally intrusive and justified 
by a strong governmental interest to prevent drug traffic. 
Sergeant Pearson was able to articulate specific facts which when 
viewed in light of his knowledge and expertise gave him 
reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed. 
ARGUMENT 
PQINT_I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, A DEFENDANT CANNOT ENTER A 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY AND PRESERVE THE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL A TRIAL COURT'S PRE-TRIAL 
RULING. 
In Utah, n[a] plea of guilty is a confession of the 
correctness of the accusation which dispenses with the necessity 
of proot thereof." S£a t e_y.._ Sie wari, 110 Utah 203 , 171 P. 2d 383, 
385 (1946). Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily 
entered, no issues exist for trial. _Statg_y_._YesiS' 566 P.2d 1248 
(Utah 1977) . Once a defendant enters a plea of guilty he waives 
any claim of error. Siaie_yJL-Be£Js, 584 P*2d 870 (Utah 1978) . In 
Beck, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder. On appeal, 
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defendant claimed the s t a t ement of the peace o f f i c e r in the 
warrant of a r r e s t was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a f ind ing of 
p robable c a u s e . The Court found t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a of g u i l t y 
waived any claim of e r r o r on behalf of the o f f i c e r . S££_.S1JS£ 
S±fiJt£_JLi_Ti2£nej;, 30 Utah 2d 286, 517 P.2d 536 (1973) . 
The fact that defendant in the present case entered a 
plea of no contest, as opposed to a guilty plea, is of no 
consequence. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2 (1982) provides in part: 
(3) A plea of no contest indicates the accused 
does not challenge the charges in the information 
or indictment and if accepted by the court shall 
have the same effect as a plea of guilty and 
imposition of sentence may be rendered in the 
same manner as if a plea of guilty had been 
entered. 
In N££il}_£3rolina^v^_A1 f ord , 400 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1970) the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Implicit in the nolo contendere cases is a 
recognition that the Constitution does not bar 
imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused 
who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt 
but who, faced with grim alternatives, is 
willing to waive his trial and accept the 
sentence. • • . [A] plea of guilty rather 
than a plea of n.2l2_.££ni£Qdj£££ is of no 
constitutional significance with respect to the 
issue now before us, for the Constitution is 
concerned with the practical consequences, not 
the formal categorizations, of state law. 
Although the State would ordinarily argue that because 
defendant pled guilty he has waived any claim of error for 
purposes of appeal, the instant case presents a unique situation 
in that the State mistakenly agreed with defendant that he could 
enter into a conditional plea and appeal the denial of his motion 
to suppress. A disposal of the instant case on the basis of 
waiver would likely result in a habeas corpus petition wherein 
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defendant would argue that his counsel was ineffective and 
further, that prosecutorial error occurred resulting in a plea 
which was involuntary and unintelligent. Thus, the State 
contends that the most expeditious and equitable manner to 
proceed in this case is to remand this case to the trial court 
and permit defendant to withdraw his plea. 
Defendant argued to the trial court and will most 
likely argue to this Court that a conditional plea of the present 
type aids judicial economy, in that the parties and the court 
need not proceed with a trial on the facts. A remand by this 
Court would still permit the parties to proceed in an expeditious 
manner. Should defendant decide to plead guilty, no trial would 
take place. On the other hand, should defendant plead not 
guilty, thereby preserving the suppression issue for purposes of 
appeal, the parties could stipulate to the facts and conduct a 
short bench trial. 
Defendant also argued at trial that a conditional plea 
is permitted under Si3i£_3Li._K,3yf 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). The 
State strongly encourages this Court to limit the decision in K^y 
to the facts. In Kjy, the Utah Supreme Court found that a judge 
could accept a guilty plea conditioned upon an agreement not to 
impose the death penalty. According to the Court, nothing in 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-ll(f) (1982) 
prohibits a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement 
that asks the court to commit itself in advance to imposing a 
sentence lawfully within its power. I&. at 1300. Thus, the 
acceptance of such a conditional plea was proper. I&. at 1301. 
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It is true that Rule 11 does not specifically prohibit 
conditional pleas of the type at issue in the present case, 
wherein defendant wishes to plead guilty and appeal a pre-trial 
ruling. However, in the instant case, unlike Kay, Utah case law 
clearly does not permit defendant to plead guilty and then raise 
errors, other than the voluntariness of the plea, on appeal. 
Sifl±£-XA.XfiCJSi 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977); Siste^y^Beek, 584 P. 2d 
870 (Utah 1978). Further, the acceptance of a conditional plea 
of the present type militates against achieving finality in the 
criminal process. Guilty pleas conditioned on the right to 
appeal pre-trial rulings are ambiguous, at best. Where in Kay 
the condition pertains only to what punishment will be imposed, 
here defendant wishes to preserve for appeal the very factual 
basis upon which the guilty plea rests. In KsYr the defendant 
admitted fully the factual basis for his plea but only agreed to 
do so if he would receive a particular sentence. Here, the 
defendant wishes to avoid a trial while still disputing the very 
foundation of his plea. Because of the present Utah case law on 
guilty pleas, this Court should not read Ks¥ as permitting 
conditional pleas of the present type and instead should limit 
KS¥ to its facts. In any event, should this Court question the 
applicability of the Ksy decision to the present case, that 
question is one for the Supreme Court to decide, since a ruling 
that Ksy is applicable would result in the Supreme Court's 
decisions in BecK and Yfick being overruled. 
1
 It is apparant from Kay that no Utah case law existed which 
prohibited a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement 
that asked the court to commit itself in advance to imposing a 
sentence within its power. 
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Although an intermediate court df appeals is certainly 
free to criticize the rulings of the superior appellate court, 
£ £ e , £ ± a A f SfilbX-XA.DfiEflIilDfini-fl£.MflJtflj:-Yfilli£lfiSr 168 Cal. Rptr. 
36, 37-38 (Cal. App. 1980), in performing the primary "error-
correcting" function in a two-tiered appellate system, it is not 
in a position to overrule superior authority, and it generally 
should refrain from pertorming its "law-declaring" function in 
cases of great moment. See S£aie_v^_G£awi£i], 123 Wis.2d 428, 
432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Wis. App. 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986) (authorizing certification of issues to 
Supreme Court). 
£QINT_II 
THE DETENTION OF DEFENDANT AND HIS LUGGAGE 
WAS LAWFUL SINCE THE OFFICERS HAD A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION BASED UPON OBJECTIVE 
FACTS THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENGAGER IN ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITY. 
Sery's appeal raises two issues. He contends in point 
II that the detention of him and his luggage was an investigatory 
stop within T^rry_v±_QhiQ, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that because 
reasonable suspicion did not exist, all evidence obtained as a 
result of the stop was improperly admitted into court. Then in 
point III he argues that the detention was not an investigatory 
stop, but instead an arrest lacking probable cause. The State 
will address both of these issues together. 
It is well established that this Court should "not 
disturb the ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of 
evidence unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error." S£a£e_Y^Gallfisas, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985); Siaie 
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iU-Gxay* 717 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah 1986). Further, the trial 
judge is in the best position to determine the reasonableness of 
the conduct under the particular facts of each case, S£ate_yA 
Hfiiiser, 669 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983) (per curiam). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) 2 is the controlling rule for all 
motions to suppress evidence for an allegedly unlawful search or 
seizure. Although originally enacted by the legislature, Rule 
12(g) was formally adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as a rule of 
Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence 
or the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the 
suppression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court 
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The court 
shall set forth its reasons for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all cases be 
deemed substantial if one or more of the following is established 
by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful, 
malicious, shocking to the conscience of the court or was a 
result of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant to 
a general order of that agency: 
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass without 
legitimate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting in 
good faith under this section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure 
standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter 
future violations of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes that the 
search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must 
then, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith 
actions of the peace officer. 
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procedure in In^Esi Rylgs of Pyoc^duye, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1985), pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the trial court's 
ruling must be reviewed in the context of that rule. Sjg£ S£at£ 
YjL-CaSSf 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 63, 64, P. 2d , (Ct. 
App. 1987) (recognizing that Rule 12(g) is the applicable rule 
for suppression issues in the search and seizure context). 
Rule 12(g), which applies equally to suppression 
motions brought under the fourth amendment and article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, requires exclusion of unlawfully 
seized evidence only where the police officer's violation is both 
substantial and not committed in good faith. That means a court 
must determine whether, given the circumstalnces presented, the 
officer's conduct was objectively reasonable before a decision on 
suppression is made. This is consistent with federal case law 
recognizing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
both the warrant and warrantless contexts. See Illinpis^y^ 
Krull, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987) (warrantless 
context); Un i ted_S ta tes_yJL_Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (warrant 
context); Uniied_Si3£jiS-.yJL_Willi^ms, 622 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 
1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (warrantless context).3 
Any questions concerning the validity of Rule 12(g) are not 
properly before this Court, it being bound by a rule of procedure 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has pending before it the question of Rule 12(g) 's 
constitutionality. Sge State v. Babbell, Ut. Sup. Ct. No. 21033, 
Brief of Respondent at 23-42 (attached as an addendum to this 
petition.) 
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In the instant case the record is clear the officers 
acted in good faith and in a reasonable/ diligent manner (R. 53). 
Further, as the State argues below no violation of defendant's 
rights occurred since the officers possessed reasonable suspicion 
to make an investigatory stop. 
It is clear that not all seizures of a person must be 
justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime. Flsxida-.:^ 
BflYSXf 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1982). The Court in Ter ry_ vA_0£io, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968) created a limited exception to the rule that any 
restraint on a person was a seizure and thus invalid unless 
probable cause was present. This exception is that certain 
seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. Utah has codified this constitutionally mandated 
"reasonable suspicion": 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand a 
name, address and an explanation of his 
action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (19 82). Sge_also Siate_v^_D£i£man_and 
LQzanQ, 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, P.2d (1987) (per curiam); 
£±aJt£-.^-CaipeJi§, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986); Siate_\u 
Tiiijill^f 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, P.2d (Ct App. 1987). 
There are three separate levels of police encounters 
with the public which are constitutionally permissible. They 
are: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
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the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
St3t5 v« Deitman and Lozano, 5 8 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 4 P.2d 
(1987) (per curiam) ciiing Uniifid_SiflifiS-XjL.Mfilliii# 736 F.2d 
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984) . 
In this case the initial encounter between the officers 
and defendant falls into the first category. The officers 
approached defendant with the following knowledge: he had just 
arrived from Florida, a known source of cocaine and marijuana 
traffic to the western and northwestern states (R. 57) , his 
behavior and mannerisms were very nervous (fc. 40-42), he picked 
up a pay phone repeatedly without making a call (R. 79), and he 
took an unusual, awkward route from the pay phone back to the 
concourse (R. 42). 
The officers initially approached defendant to question 
him. At this time defendant was not detained against his will 
and was not arrested. Deiiinan_iind_Lozano, 5 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
24. "Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in 
another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer 
some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is 
willing to listen . . . ." Fsiid a^y^R&yfii, 460 U.S. 491, 497 
(1983) . 
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Though there may be no probable cause to make 
an arrest/ a police officer may, in 
appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner/ approach a person for 
investigating possible criminal behavior. 
gtfl.te_yJt_Wi^ jBDbacJs, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980). As this 
Court stated in £Jfc3±£_2jL_llUjilIg, 6 0 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 P. 2d 
(Ct. App. 1987) : 
[a] seizure does not occur when a police 
officer merely approaches an individual on 
the street and questions him, if the person 
is willing to listen. However, the person 
approached is not required to answer the 
officer's question, and his refusal to listen 
to the officer's questions or answer them, 
without more, does not furnish reasonable 
grounds for further detention. 
Id. at 53. 
The State concedes that the police lacked reasonable 
suspicion when they initially approached defendant, however, no 
seizure occurred at this time and defendant was free to leave and 
not answer the officer's questions. Further, defendant does not 
challenge the initial encounter with the officer but only the 
subsequent detention of his luggage (App. Br. at 6). 
After the initial encounter with defendant the officers 
obtained additional facts which caused them to believe that 
defendant was comittmg a crime. Based upon these facts, they 
then detained defendant's luggage for the purpose of subjecting 
it to a "canine sniff" for narcotics. In determining whether 
that detention was proper, this Court must first determine 
whether the detention amounted to a seizure. 
This issue was addressed in Uni££d_££a±£.S_.¥-*_Plja£.e/ 462 
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U.S. 696 (1983). There, the Court ruled that: 
[I]n the case of detention of luggage within 
the traveler's immediate possession, the 
police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's 
possessory interest in his luggage as well as 
his liberty interest in proceeding with his 
itinerary. The person whose luggage is 
detained is technically still free to 
continue his travels or carry out other 
personal activities pending release of the 
luggage. Moreover, he is not subjected to 
the coercive atmosphere of a custodial 
confinement or to the public indignity of 
being personally detained. Nevertheless, 
such a seizure can effectively restrain the 
person since he is subjected to the possible 
disruption of his travel plans in order to 
remain with his luggage or to arrange for its 
return. Therefore, when the police seize 
luggage from the suspect's custody, we think 
the limitations applicable to investigative 
detentions of the person should define the 
permissible scope of an investigative 
detention of the person's luggage on less 
than probable cause. 
Id. at 708-09. 
In light of Place, there is no question that defendant 
was seized at the moment the officers took his luggage and 
subjected it to a "canine sniff". The question then becomes 
whether the seizure amounted to an investigatory stop or an 
arrest. 
In Uniisd-Si^i^s^v^^SharEe, 470 UlS. 675 (1984) the 
Court addressed the difficulty in distinguishing between an 
investigative stop and an arrest: 
Obviously, if an investigative stop continues 
indefinitely, at some point it can no longer 
be justified as an investigative stop. But 
our cases impose no rigid time limitation on 
Teryy stops. While it is clear that "the 
brevity of the invasion of the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests is an important 
factor in determining whether the seizure is 
so minimally intrusive as to be j^istifiable 
on reasonable suspicion, we have Emphasized 
the need to consider the law enforcement 
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purposes to be served by the stop as well as 
the time reasonably needed to effectuate 
those purposes. Much as a "bright line" rule 
would be desirable, in evaluating whether an 
investigative detention is unreasonable, 
common sense and ordinary human experience 
must govern over rigid criteria. 
Id. at 685. 
The defendant relies heavily upon Florida,y. Rgyer # 460 
U.S. 491 (1983) as authority that the detention of defendant in 
the present case rose to the level of an arrest requiring 
probable cause. In Roysi, two detectives approached Royer and 
obtianed his airline ticket and luggage making it clear that he 
was not free to leave. They then closeted him in a small area 
and confronted him. Based upon these events the Court concluded 
that the seizure amounted to an arrest. Id. at 496. Defendant, 
however, ignores the following language in Bayer: 
If it [a trained narcotics detection dog] had 
been used, Royer and his luggage could have 
been momentarily detained while this 
investigative procedure was carried out. 
Indeed, it may be that no detention at all 
would have been necessary. A negative result 
would have freed Royer in short order; a 
positive result would have resulted in his 
justifiable arrest on probable cause. 
Id. at 505-06. 
In any event, we hold here that the officers 
had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Royer's luggage contained drugs, and we 
assume that the use of dogs in the 
investigation would not have entailed any 
prolonged detention of either Royer or his 
luggage which may involve other Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 
Id. at 506, n.10. 
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Defendant also relies upon Unii££_jSia£es_vA_Pl.§££, 46 2 
U.S. 696 (1983) as authority that the detention in the instant 
case was an arrest and not an investigatory stop. In Plac$ > 
however, the Court ruled that the length of the detention of the 
luggage, 90 minutes, alone precluded the conclusion that the 
seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause. I&. at 
709. 
The Court in Hni££a_££s±es_x*_M£rifleil]3SlI, 446 U.S. 544, 
561 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring) stated that the reasonableness 
of a stop depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Of particular emphasis is "(i) the public interest served by the 
seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) 
the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied 
in light of his knowledge and expertise." £d. at 561. See also 
B£Own_ v^Te^as r 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979); ^el awai e^y^JPr ouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 654-55; Terry.y^Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 
These three factors provide significant guijdance on whether a 
seizure amounts to an investigatory stop or an arrest. 
A. THE PUBLIC INTEREST SERVED BY THE SEIZURE. 
The Court has made it clear that the public has a 
compelling interest in detecting those who tratfic in drugs for a 
profit. As stated in Mendenhftll* n[m]uch of the drug tratfic is 
highly organized and conducted by sophisticated criminal 
syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs, • . . may 
be easily concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of 
illegal conduct may be unmatched in any other area of law 
enforcement." 466 U.S. at 561. Furthermore, 
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[b]ecause of the inherently transient nature 
of drug courier activity at airports, 
allowing police to make brief investigative 
stops of persons at airports on reasonable 
suspicion of drug-tratficking substantially 
enhances the likelihood that police will be 
able to prevent the flow of narcotics into 
distribution channels. 
Ela££r 462 U.S. at 704. 
Clearly, a strong governmental interest exists in 
stopping drug traffic at airports and thus, justifying the stop 
of Sery. 
B. NATURE AND SCOPE OF INTRUSION. 
Against the strong governmental interest, this Court 
must weigh the nature and extent of any intrusion upon Fourth 
Amendment rights when police briefly detain luggage for limited 
investigative purposes. 
The scope of a detention must be tailored to its 
underlying justification. An investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. The methods employed should be the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the 
officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Florid a_v_1._R£y£r, 
460 U.S. 491, 450 (1982) . 
In determining whether a seizure is so minimally 
intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion two 
factors should be considered: 1) the brevity of the invasion, and 
2) the diligence of the police in pursuing their investigation. 
El3££r 462 U.S. 696, 709; Unii£d_S;tai£S_2A_Sh3Ifi£, 470 U.S. 675, 
686 (1984); MicliigflD-XA-SiUDIDfi £3 f 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981). 
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While brevity of the invasion is a consideration, the 
Court has been careful not to impose rigid time limitations. 
Recognizing the desirability of providing al clear cut rule for 
law enforcement authorities,4 the Court recognizes as more 
important the need for authorities to be alqle to graduate their 
responses to the demands of any particular situation. Pl£££, 462 
U.S. at 709, n. 10. The critical determination in whether a 
detention is too long is "whether the policje diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it w^s necessary to detain 
the defendant." Sfcaxpe, 470 U.S. at 686. Further, a court 
should consider whether the police are actijng in a swiftly 
developing situation, and the court should i^ot indulge in 
unrealistic second-guessing. Id. at 686. 
A creative judge engaged in post hoc 
evaluation of police conduct can Almost 
always imagine some alternative mbans by 
which the objectives of the police might have 
been accomplished. But the fact that the 
protection of the public might, ip the 
abstract, have been accomplished by 'less 
intrusive1 means does not, by itself, render 
the search unreasonable. 
Id. at 686-87. 
In El3££f the Court considered both the brevity of the 
invasion and the diligence of the officers. Not only did the 
length of the detention, 90 minutes, rise to the level of an 
* The ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(1) 
(1975) recommends a maximum of 20 minutes f^ >r an investigave 
stop. 
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arrest but further: 
the violation was exacerbated by the failure of 
the agents to accurately inform respondent of 
the place to which they were transporting his 
luggage, of the length of time he might be 
dispossessed, and of what arrangements would 
be made for return of the luggage if the 
investigation dispelled the suspicion. 
Pl3££/ 462 U.S. at 710. 
In the instant case the officers made every diligent 
effort to see that the stop was no more intrusive than necessary. 
After the initial encounter with defendant/ the officer indicated 
that he was free to leave (R. 43). After further investigation 
which gave Sgt. Pearson reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
carrying narcotics, he requested one of the agents to obtain a 
"drug detection dog" (R. 49). Between the time of the first 
encounter with defendant/ approximately 11:05/ until the dog 
arrived/ approximately noontime, no one approached defendant (R. 
50). Once the dog arrived/ defendant was asked if he would 
submit his bag to a sniff by a drug detection dog to which 
defendant refused (R. 51). Defendant was then advised that he 
and his bag were being detained to permit the dog to sniff the 
bag (R. 51). Defendant gave his bag to the officer who took the 
bag behind the counter (R. 51). Officer Pearson told defendant 
that he could not accompany his bag because of security measures 
(R. 51). He further explained to defendant that his bag would be 
placed into a lineup with other bags and would be presented to 
the dog and based upon the dog's reaction the bag would be 
returned to the front of the counter and the next step of the 
procedure would be explained to defendant (R. 51-52) . At no time 
did the officer attempt to conceal the process from defendant (R. 
-20-
52-53). In fact, the officer testified thbt he tried; 
[T]o conduct a good-faith, expeditious 
situation to try to either confitm 
or dispel the presence of a controlled 
substance in the defendant's bag as quickly 
as possible, as fairly as possible, and in 
the best means that were present at the 
particular time* 
(R. 53) . Defendant was detained for 5-15 tninutes at the most (R. 
88-89). Once the dog had a positive reaction to the bag 
probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant (R. 
55) . 
The present case did not involve any delay unnecessary 
to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. 
Defendant has presented no evidence that the officers were 
dilatory in their investigation. The 5-15 minute detainment was 
reasonable under the circumstances and the intrusion placed upon 
defendant was minimal. Sge_.3l.sp _______Si£i___v__S___2e, 470 
U.S. 675 (1984) (20 minute detention reasonable); U_ited_States 
v__A.lpert, 816 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1987) (5(t) minute detention 
reasonable). Based upon the limited nature and scope of 
intrusion it is clear the seizure was an investigatory stop, not 
an arrest. 
C. OBJECTIVE FACTS RELIED UPON| BY THE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER^ 
Defense counsel attempted to argue at trial that defendant was 
detained for 25 minutes since the police report stated that the 
dog arrived at noon and defendant was arrested at 12:25. The 
officer, however, testified that when the Randier arrived with 
the dog he took about 10 minutes to familiarize the dog with the 
surroundings and that defendant was likely not detained until 
12:10. 
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relies upon Reid_v, ggorgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), and claims that 
his case is indistinguishable from Rsi3 wherein the Court found 
that reasonable suspicion was not present. 
In R£i£, the agent concluded that the defendant was 
transporting drugs because defendant appeared to fit within the 
"drug courier profile". The "drug courier profile" is a 
compilation of characteristics believed to be typical of persons 
unlawfully carrying narcotics. R£i3, 448 U.S. at 441; Ufliifid 
£££i££_ v^Mfind entail, 446 U.S. 559, 562 (1980) .6 Specifically, 
the agent in Rjgid relied upon the following observed 
circumstances: 1) defendant arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a 
principal place of origin of cocaine sold elsewhere in the 
country, 2) the defendant arrived in the early morning, when law 
enforcement activity is diminished, 3) defendant and his 
companion appeared to be trying to conceal the fact that they 
were traveling together, and 4) they had no luggage other than 
±h£ll_Should£r_ba2£A 
The Supreme Court has never stated what they deem to be the 
cnaracteristics within the drug courier profile. Other courts 
have recognized the characteristics as follows: 1) arrival from 
or departure to an identified source city; 2) carrying little or 
no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases; 3) unusual 
ininerary, such as a rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy 
airplane trip; 4) use of an alias; 5) carrying unusually large 
amounts of currency in the many thousands of dollars, unsually on 
their person; 6) purchasing airline ticked with a large amount of 
small denomination currency; and 7) unusual nervousness beyond 
that ordinarily exhibited by passengers. 
The secondary characteristics are 1) the almost 
exclusive use of public transportation in departing from the 
airport; 2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning; 
3) leaving a false call-back telephone number with the airline 
being utilized; and 4) excessively frequent travel to source or 
distribution cities. UQIte3_jgia£es_xA_Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
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The Court concluded as a matter c^f law that the agent 
could not have reasonably suspected the defendant of criminal 
activity. The fact that defendant proceeded another person and 
occasionally looked backward at him was the only fact which 
related to their particular conduct. "The (agent's belief that 
petitioner and his companion were attempting to conceal the fact 
that they were traveling together was more an 'inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch' than a fair inference in the 
light of his experience, is simply too slender a reed to support 
the seizure in this case." I&. at 441. Ttie other circumstances 
relied upon by the agent describe a large cjategory of innocent 
travelers. 
Defendant argues in his brief th^ 
not relate defendant's behavior to a drug c 
thus, somehow this supports defendant's arg 
suspicion was lacking (App. Br. 13, R. 25). 
any Supreme Court decision that the Court h 
rejected the "drug courier profile". Although small parts of the 
drug courier profile did not, standing alon^, provide the 
reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to justify a stop in 
JBfildf the Court later found in Royer that parts of the profile 
t Sergeant Pearson did 
ourier profile and 
lument that reasonable 
It is not clear from 
as either adopted or 
were sufficient to justify reasonable suspi 
[w]e agree with the State that wh 
officers discovered that Royer wa 
under an assumed name, this fact, 
facts already known to the office 
cash for a one-way ticket, the mode of 
checking the two bags, and Royer' 
and conduct in general - were adequate 
pion: 
en the 
|s traveling 
and the 
^
s
 " paying 
p appearance 
grounds for detaining him and his 
while they attempted to verify or 
their suspicions in a manner that 
luggage 
dispel 
did not 
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exceed the limits of an investigative 
detection. 
Bfiifil, 460 U.S. at 502. 
In Unii£d_Siaies_\u_B£r£y, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) 
the Court held that "the profile is nothing more than an 
administrative tool of the police. The presence or absence or a 
particular characteristic on any particular profile is of no 
legal significance in the determination of reasonable suspicion." 
I&. a t 600. The court concluded that two consequences stemmed 
from their holding: 
First, a match between certain 
characteristics listed on the profile and 
characteristics exhibited by a defendant does 
not automatically establish reasonable 
suspicion. Rather, critical to any finding 
that reasonable suspicion existed is an 
evaluation of the reasonableness of a 
particular search or seizure in light of the 
particular circumstances. 
[Second,] [a]lthough a match between a 
defendant's characteristics and some of the 
characteristics on a drug courier profile 
does not automatically support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion, the fact that a 
characteristic of a defendant also happens to 
appear on the profile does not preclude its 
use as a justification providing reasonable 
suspicion for a stop. If an officer can 
demonstrate why some factor, interpreted with 
due regard for the officer's experience and 
not merely in light of its presence on the 
profile, was, in the particular circumstances 
of the facts at issue, of such import as to 
support a reasonable suspicion that an 
individual was involved in drug smuggling, we 
do not believe that a court should downgrade 
the importance of that factor merely because 
it happens to be part of the profile. 
Id. at 600-01. 
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The State urges this Court to follow the reasoning in 
BfijLEy and not adopt the use of the profile as a basis alone for a 
stop in a drug trafficking case. The better test is that stated 
in Te££y and ]?l£S,e and re at firmed by this 0ourt in 2L]1J±11Q: 
whether specific, articulable facts j.n thig_gflse* considered on 
the totality of circumstances, indicate reasonable suspicion. 
Further, whether the requisite degree of suspicion exists, the 
agents1 observation should be viewed by this Court as a whole, 
rather than as discrete and disconnected odcurences. These 
observations must be viewed through the eyds of persons who, like 
the agents in this case, are trained to cull significance from 
behavior that would appear innocent to the untrained observer. 
Itenfenhallr 446 U.S. at 564. "The officer is entitled to assess 
the facts in light of his experience." Staffc£_y_,._TXJJjillfl/ 6 0 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 54 (citations omitted). ^ee_also UnitecLSiate^ 
2U_E£it£Ir 818 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1987). 
In the instant case, the facts relied upon by the 
agents have been ruled on in other courts afe providing reasonable 
suspicion for a stop. The following facts have Sergeant Pearson 
reasonable suspicion: 1) defendant arrived prom Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, a known entrance point for illegal narcotics in the 
United States (R. 39, 44, 57), Unitfid-SiaJtfiJ5-^ jL-2iJaIiJBi # 723 F.2d 
779, 789 (11th Cir. 1984); 2) defendant appeared nervous and 
watchful and waited at the deplaning area before proceeding to 
the luggage area (R. 40, 71-72), Uniied_Siaies_yJL_Luc£i, 758 F.2d 
153, 154 (6th Cir. 1985); 3) defendant went to a telephone booth 
and picked up the phone several times without making a call (R. 
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79), IZnl££fl_S£a£££_YJL_flanSfln r 801 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1986); 
4) defendant took an awkward route away from the phones to the 
concourse avoiding the agents (R. 42); 5) defendant was traveling 
under an assumed name (R. 43), Rgygx, 460 U.S. at 502; 6) 
defendant claimed to have no identification of any kind (R. 43), 
Uniied^Siaies^y^^EspiQO^azGufiixa9 80 5 F.2d 1502, 1508 (11th Cir. 
1986); and 7) defendant left a non-working telephone number with 
the airline (R. 45, 55, 71), E£EJLnQ.Sj3rSu£j:i3 805 F.2d at 1508. 
"Perhaps none of these facts, standing alone, would give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion; but taken together as appraised by an 
experienced law enforcement officer, they provided clear 
justification to stop the [defendant] and pursue a limited 
investigation." UDIted_Siates^y^JLharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 n. 3 
(1984). Sge^alsa Tj;±rjillo, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. at 54. 
It is true that these characteristics match those 
within the drug courier profile. However, nowhere is it stated 
that the presence of these characteristics in the profile alone, 
established reasonable suspicion. Instead, Sgt. Pearson viewed 
these facts in light of his experience and found reasonable 
suspicion to exist* 
Sergeant Pearson has extensive experience and training 
in narcotics investigation: he worked in narcotics with the Miami 
Police for 19 years, attended extensive training programs, formed 
drug interdiction programs, and is presently an instructor with 
the drug enforcement administration and a supervisor of a drug 
interdiction program (R. 45-49). For the last nine years he has 
worked with an interdiction unit attempting to identify people 
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violating the drug statutes through the usel of commercial 
transportation and has made 200 arrests, 75J% of the arrests 
resulting in convictions (R. 48). Based upon his extensive 
training and experience, he was able to cite to specific 
articulable facts which supported his reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was transporting narcotics. Tllijjillfir 60 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 54. 
The facts do not support defendant's assertion that the 
detention amounted to an arrest requiring probable cause. In 
light of the three part test provided in Menden&all, it is clear 
that defendant was temporarily detained as part of an 
investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion on the part of 
the agents. Viewing the record in light of Sergeant Pearson's 
experience and training, the record supports a finding that 
reasonable suspicion was present and the stpp was minimally 
intrusive. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the order of the trial court 
denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as 
the result of the stop and further, to atfirji 
conviction. 
m defendant's 
DATED this Z/i_ day of September , 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
WILLIAM H. BABBELL, 
Def e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 21033 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
COU APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF TWO 
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT, A FIRST 
FELONY, AND ONE COUNT OF AGGRAVATED 
NAPPING, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE, 
IN 
PR 
NTS OF 
DEGREE 
KID-
THE 
AND FOR 
THE 
ESIDING. 
DAVID L. 
Attorney 
DAVID B. 
A s s i s t a n 
236 Sta i 
WILKINSON 
General 
THOMPSON 
Attorney 
Capitol 
General 
S a l t Lakfe C i ty r Utah 84114 
Attorney^ for Respondent 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
S a l t Lake Legal Defenders Assn . 
333 South Second East 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Attorney for A p p e l l a n t 
B. Rule 12(g) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As par t of his argument on appeal 
that the evidence he challenges should have 
Utah R. Crim P. 12(g) . 8 Although defendant 
the appropriateness or cons t i t u t i ona l i t y of 
that t h i s Court has never ful ly discussed t 
, defendant contends 
been excluded under 
does not challenge 
Rule 12 (g), given 
he ru le , the Sta te 
wil l f i r s t examine the current s t a tus of thpls modified 
exclusionary rule in Utah's criminal jus t i ce system. The 
question of whether exclusion was required tinder Rule 12(g) wi l l 
then be addressed. 
8
 Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admiss ib i l i ty of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant t o th i ? section or a t t r i a l , 
upon grounds of unlawful search and se izure! the suppression of 
evidence shal l not be granted unless the court finds the 
v io la t ion 
v io la t ion 
forth i t s 
(2) An 
upon which i t i s based to be both 
and not committed in good f a i t h , 
reasons for such finding, 
unlawful search or seizure shall 
a substant ia l 
The court shal l s e t 
in a l l cases be deemed 
i s es tabl ished by the 
the evidence: 
w i l l fu l , malicious, 
was a r e su l t of the 
t o 
agency pursuant to a general 
harass without 
W 
in addition 
the following: 
subs tan t ia l if one or more of the following 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of 
(i) The v io la t ion was grossly negligent , 
shocking to the conscience of the court or 
prac t ice of the law enforcement 
order of tha t agency; 
( i i ) The v io la t ion was intended only 
leg i t imate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting in good 
fa i th under t h i s sec t ion, the court shal l consider, 
to any other relevant f ac to r s , some or a l l 
( i ) The 
s tandards ; 
( i i ) The extent t o which exclusion wi l l 
v io l a t ions of search and seizure s tandards; 
( i i i ) Whether or not the officer was pro4eeding 
search warrant, a r r e s t warrant, or relying 
d i r ec t ions of a magistrate or prosecutor; ori 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant e s tab l i shes tha t the search 
or se izure was unlawful and subs tan t ia l by ^ preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace officer or governmental lagency must then, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good fa i th act ions of 
the peace o t f i c e r . 
extent of deviation from legal search and seizure 
tend t o deter future 
by way of a 
previous speci f ic 
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At the outse t , i t i s necessary to summarize the 
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s tory of Rule 12(g) and t h i s Court's treatment of 
i t in the case law. In 1982 , the l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Rule 12(g) 
as part of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act (19 82 Utah Laws 
ch* 1 0 , SS 1 - 1 6 ) . During the time that Rule 12(g) operated as a 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rule of criminal procedure, t h i s Court 
never ruled upon i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . See State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d at 1103. In September 1985, the Court in In Re: Rules 
of Procedure, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) , adopted a l l e x i s t i n g 
s tatutory ru l e s of procedure not i n c o n s i s t e n t with procedural 
r u l e s previously adopted by the Court. This adminis trat ive 
rul ing was made in response to the amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII , 
s e c t i o n 4 of the Utah Const i tut ion 9 which were approved by the 
v o t e r s in November 1984 and became e f f e c t i v e on July 1 , 1985. 
See Compiler's Notes, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, Replacement Vol. 1A at 
58 (Supp. 1986) . The amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the Court's rule-making author i ty , which had 
previously only been accorded by s t a t u t e , gee UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-4 (1977) (amended 1986); 1943 Utah Laws ch. 3 3 , S 1 (which 
gave the Court rule-making power in a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s ) . Since 
rece iv ing f u l l rule-making power in 1943, the Court apparently 
^ A r t i c l e VIII , s e c t i o n 4 now provides in pert inent part: 
The supreme court shal l adopt r u l e s of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the s t a t e 
and sha l l by ru le manage the appel late process . The 
l e g i s l a t u r e may amend the ru les of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of a l l members of both houses of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . • . • 
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has never independent ly d e v i s e d and adopted 
procedure; t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has h i s t o r i c a l l y ] 
See UTAH CODE ANN. S 1 0 5 - 1 - 1 £± ££&. (1943) 
1-1 ££ £ £ 3 . ( 1 9 5 3 ) ; UTAH CODE ANN. S 7 7 - 1 - 1 
CODE ANN. S 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 £ t £ £ 3 . ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 1° Thisj 
w i th t h e r u l e s of c i v i l procedure or the r u l e s of e v i d e n c e . See 
S t a t e v . Banner, 717 P.2d 1 3 2 5 , 1332-33 (Utbh 1986) : Brickyard 
Homeownerst A s s ' n . v . Gibbons Realty? 668 pj 
1 9 8 3 ) . In Re; Rules of Procedure marks th 
Court has independent ly adopted r u l e s of cr 
i t did so through an apparent w h o l e s a l e adobt ion of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted r u l e s c o n t a i n e d i n UT^ H CODE ANN. § 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 
e t s e q . ( 1 9 8 2 ) . There be ing no p r e v i o u s l y 
cr imina l procedure , the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s r u l e s 
the C o u r t ' s r u l e s — u n q u a l i f i e d . There fore , 
proceed ing on t h e assumption t h a t Rule 12 (g 
r u l e of cr imina l procedure formal ly adopted 
t h a t i t i s t h e c o n t r o l l i n g r u l e for a l l mot 
r u l e s of cr iminal 
performed t h i s t a s k . 
; UTAH CODE ANN. S 7 7 -
Sl £ £ 3 - ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; UTAH 
has not been t h e case 
.2d 535 , 539 (Utah 
le f i r s t time t h a t the 
iminal procedure; and 
e v i d e n c e for an a l l e g e d l y unlawful search or s e i z u r e . See S t a t e 
v . Hygh, 711 P.2d a t 27 3 (Zimmerman, J . , co 
("I have found no c a s e i n which t h i s Court 
pourt -adopted r u l e s of 
presumably are now 
t h e S t a t e i s 
|) i s in p lace as a 
by t h i s Court, and 
i o n s t o suppress 
ncurr ing s e p a r a t e l y ) 
has dec ided t o adopt 
t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e a f t e r independent ly ana lyz ing t h e q u e s t i 
of what remedy i s a v a i l a b l e for an unlawful 
on 
search or s e i z u r e 
10 i n 1 9 8 0 , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , for the f i r s t t i m e , s p e c i f i c a l l y 
d e s i g n a t e d t h e r u l e s of cr imina l procedure and s e t them apart i n 
chapter 35 of t i t l e 77 . I 
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under our s t a t e const i tut ion") .11 
Having said t h i s , two i s s u e s require t h i s Court's 
cons iderat ion: (1) To what extent i s the t rad i t iona l 
exclusionary rule required under the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n or the 
s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n ? (2) I s Rule 1 2 ( g ) r the Court's ru le , a 
permiss ib le remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of the accused's r ights under 
the fourth amendment and a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 14? These i s s u e s are 
raised by the State because t h i s Court has never f u l l y d iscussed 
i t s ra t iona le for applying an exclusionary rule for unlawful 
searches and se i zures in cases prior t o i t s adoption of Rule 
1 2 ( g ) , or d i sc losed i t s ra t iona le for adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which 
represents a clear departure from the exclusionary rule the Court 
has t r a d i t i o n a l l y appl ied. The Sta te simply o f f er s the fo l lowing 
a n a l y s i s as support for the Court's adoption of Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
The S t a t e ' s approach to these i s s u e s w i l l not be an 
or ig ina l one. Four helpful law review a r t i c l e s on the 
exclusionary rule w i l l be r e l i e d upon in developing the 
d i scuss ion that fol lows—Coe, "The ALI S u b s t a n t i a l i t y Test : A 
F l ex ib l e Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction," 10 Ga. L. Rev. 1 
(1975); Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule," 26 Stan . 
L. Rev. 1027 (1974); Schroeder, "Deterring Fourth Amendment 
V i o l a t i o n s : A l ternat ives t o the Exclusionary Rule," 69 Geo. L.J. 
1361 (1981); and Stewart, "The Road t o Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: 
The Origins , Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1983) . The 
H Jus t i ce Zimmerman's concurrence was i ssued prior to the 
issuance of In Re: Rules of Procedure. 
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ule under our s ta te 
the Court to consider 
focus here w i l l be s l i g h t l y d i f ferent from that in other b r i e f s 
on the subject recent ly f i l e d by the S ta te in State v. Mendoza, 
Case No- 20922, a case currently pending before the Court. 
Although the Mendoza br ie f s provide a good s tar t ing point for a 
d i scuss ion of Rule 12(g)
 r they do not addresls pertinent quest ions 
regarding the neces s i ty of an exclusionary r|i 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . Accordingly, the State urges 
the S t a t e ' s arguments in Mendoza in l i g h t of I the discuss ion of 
Rule 12(g) presented here. 
Three Supreme Court cases are general ly credited with 
producing the exclusionary rule—Boyd v. Unijted States> 116 U.S. 
616 (1886); Adams v . New York, 192 U.S. 585 U904) ; Weeks v. 
United S t a t e s , 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The f a i r l y narrow rule that 
emerged from that t r i l o g y of cases was s i g n i f i c a n t l y broadened in 
subsequent cases , culminating in Agnello v. 
U.S. 20 (1925), which held that contraband se i zed in v i o l a t i o n of 
United S t a t e s , 269 
idence in a federal 
s opinions c lear ly 
the fourth amendment could not be used as ev: 
criminal t r i a l . However, none of the Court1 
i d e n t i f i e d the doctrinal bas i s for the exclusionary ru le . Then 
in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) , thd Court made clear 
that the securi ty of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the po l ice i s " impl ic i t in the concept of ordered l i b e r t y , " and 
therefore enforceable against the s t a t e s through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although i t for the f i r s t 
time e x p l i c i t l y treated the quest ion of the exc lus ion of 
i l l e g a l l y se ized evidence as a matter of rem 
right secured by the fourth amendment, the Court in Wolf refused 
e d i e s , apart from the 
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t o impose the f edera l ly fashioned exclusionary rule on the s t a t e s 
as the part icular remedy for uncons t i tu t iona l ly se ized evidence. 
The Wolf majority recognized that other "equally e f f e c t i v e " s t a t e 
methods for deterring unreasonable searches and se i zures would 
s u f f i c e . 338 U.S. at 3 1 . 
However, in 1961 the Court in Mapp v. OhiOt 367 U.S. 
643 (1961), overruled the pertinent port ions of Wolf and held 
that the exclusionary rule was appl icable to s t a t e criminal 
prosecut ions: 
Today we once again examine Wolf1 s c o n s t i t u -
t iona l documentation of the right to privacy 
from unreasonable s t a t e in trus ion , and, 
after i t s dozen years on our books, are l ed 
by i t to c lose the only courtroom door re -
maining open t o evidence secured by o f f i c i a l 
l awles sness in f lagrant abuse of that bas ic 
r igh t , reserved t o a l l persons as a s p e c i f i c 
guarantee against that very same unlawful 
conduct. We hold that a l l evidence obtained 
by searches and s e i z u r e s in v i o l a t i o n of the 
Const i tut ion i s , by that same author i ty , 
inadmiss ib le in a s t a t e court. 
367 U.S. at 654-55. F ina l l y , in a recent dec i s ion the Court 
c l e a r l y rejected the premise upon which Mapp seemed t o res t— 
i . e . , that the exclusionary rule was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required 
remedy. In United S t a t e s v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , i t 
s t a t e d : 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provis ion 
express ly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands, and 
an examination of i t s or ig in and purposes 
makes c lear that the use of f r u i t s of a 
past unlawful search or se izure "work[s] no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong." United S t a t e s 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 354 (1974). The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment i s "ful ly 
accomplished" by the unlawful search or 
se izure i t s e l f , ib id .# and the exclusionary 
rule i s ne i ther intended nor able to "cure 
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t h e invas ion of the d e f e n d a n t ' s r 
he has a l ready s u f f e r e d . " Stone 
i g h t s which 
v. Powell , 
sup ra , a t 540 (WHITE, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . The 
r u l e thus o p e r a t e s as "a j u d i c i a l 
remedy designed t o safeguard Four 
ly c r ea t ed 
r i g h t s gene ra l l y through i t s d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t . 
r a t h e r than a personal c o n s t i t u t i 
!th Amendment 
bnal r i g h t 
gtetes yt of the person a g g r i e v e d . " United Calandra , sup ra , a t 348. 
468 U.S. a t 906 (emphasis added ) . Thus, noW t h a t i t i s s e t t l e d 
t h a t the exc lus iona ry r u l e i s not r equ i red by the f ede ra l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e immediate q u e s t i o n confront ing s t a t e a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t s i s whether t he r u l e i s r equ i red by t n e i r i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
As with the four th amendment, a r t i c l e I , s e c t i on 14 
con t a in s no p r o v i s i o n exp re s s ly exc lud ing from a cr iminal t r i a l 
evidence t h a t has been ob ta ined in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands. 
Pr ior t o the Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in Mapp, which extended the 
f e d e r a l exc lus ionary r u l e t o s t a t e c r iminal p r o s e c u t i o n s , t h i s 
Court , a f t e r a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the q u e s t i o n , expres s ly he ld 
t h a t evidence should not be excluded even though i t was obta ined 
as a r e s u l t of an i l l e g a l search and s e i z u r ^ . S t a t e v. Aime, 62 
Utah 476 , 47 8-b5 , 2 20 P. 704 , 705-08 (1923) [ Sge a l so S ta t e v . 
F a i r , 10 Utah 2d 365 , 353 P.2d 615 (1960). This p o s i t i o n was in 
l i n e with t he ma jo r i ty view held by s t a t e c o u r t s a t t h a t t ime . 
Aime, 62 Utah a t 4 8 0 - 8 1 , 220 P. a t 706. I t was not u n t i l Mapp 
had been decided t h a t t he Court recognized exc lus ion as t h e 
remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of the four th amendment or a r t i c l e I , 
s e c t i o n 1 4 . S t a t e v . Louden, 15 Utah 2d 641 6 6 , 387 P.2d 240, 
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241-42 (1963)
 f vacated on other grounds, 379 U.S. 1 (1964) .12 
Since Loudent the Court has f a i t h f u l l y applied the f e d e r a l l y 
fashioned exclusionary rule in criminal cases . E.g. State v . 
Gflil<?q?S, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985); S ta te v. Harris , 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983) . However, the Supreme Court's s i g n i f i c a n t 
modif icat ion of that ru le in Leon, coupled with i t s c lear 
statement there that the rule i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required, 
g i v e s t h i s Court every reason to f u l l y d i scuss the neces s i ty of 
an exclusionary rule under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n and to explain 
why the recent ly adopted Rule 12(g) i s an appropriate r u l e . 
Three major r a t i o n a l e s for the exclusionary rule in 
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and l e g a l 
l i t e r a t u r e : (1) the remedial or personal right r a t i o n a l e ; (2) 
the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y r a t i o n a l e ; and (3) the deterrence 
r a t i o n a l e . Coe, supra at 14-24 . Although a lengthy d i scuss ion 
of each of these r a t i o n a l e s i s not pos s ib l e here, some a t t en t ion 
should be given them so that a foundation may be l a i d for a 
meaningful a n a l y s i s of Rule 12(g)—a rule which r e t a i n s exc lus ion 
as a remedy where the search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n i s both 
subs tant ia l and not committed in good f a i t h . See Rule 1 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) . 
*
2
 louden could be read as adopting the exclusionary rule as the 
s o l e remedy for an unlawful search or seizure under the s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . However, by simply c i t i n g t o Mapp, the Court 
appears to have lumped the s t a t e and federal provis ions together 
without g iv ing much thought to the independent s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ques t ion . Therefore, the State b e l i e v e s that 
J u s t i c e Zimmerman was correct in Hygh when he observed that there 
appeared to be "no case in which t h i s Court ha Id] decided to 
adopt the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the 
quest ion of what remedy i s ava i lab le for unlawful search or 
se izure under our State Cons t i tu t ion ." 711 P.2d at 2 7 3 . 
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The remedial or personal r ight r a t iona le embraces the 
notion that the exclusion of evidence i s a t igh t inherent in the 
personal cons t i tu t iona l r ight to be free from unreasonable 
searches and se izures . Ho/ever, despite some degree of support, 
the remedial or compensatory j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary 
rule has generally been re jec ted . Coe, supra a t 15; Schroeder, 
supra at 1426. But see State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d a t 1297 n. 11; 
S ta te v. Grawein, 123 Wis.2d 428, 431-32, 367 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 
(Wis. App. 1985) (c i t ing S ta te v. Kreigbaum[ 194 Wis. 229, 232, 
215 N.W. 896, 897-98 (1927)); S ta te v. Whit4, 97 Wash.2d 92, 110, 
640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982). A frequently c | t ed flaw in t h i s 
theory i s that the tex t of the fourth amendment does not d i rec t ly 
require exclusion; nor i s there anything in the events giving 
r i se to the adoption of the fourth amendment that supports the 
view tha t i t was intended to require exclusion. Stewart, supra 
at 1381. As noted e a r l i e r , the Supreme Court c lear ly rejected 
t h i s theory in Leonf 468 U.S. at 906. Because a r t i c l e I , section 
14, l i ke the fourth amendment, contains no textual requirement 
for exclusion and there appears to be nothing in the his tory of 
i t s adoption, to indica te that exclusion of ^vidence would be 
required for a v io la t ion of the provision, t h i s Court should 
again re jec t the remedial or personal r ight ra t iona le as a 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for the exclusionary rule , as i t did, for 
al l p rac t i ca l purposes, in Aime# 62 Utah a t 480-85, 220 P. 706-
08 . 
The theory tha t exclusion i s nece$sary to preserve 
j ud i c i a l i n t e g r i t y has also received much c r i t i c i sm and has 
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generally played only a minor ro le in the development of the 
exclusionary r u l e . Coe, supra a t 17. The notion underlying t h i s 
theory was perhaps best a r t i c u l a t e d in the dissent of Jus t i ce 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United S t a t e s . 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J . , d i s sen t ing ) : 
Our Government i s the potent , the omnipresent 
teacher . For good or for i l l , i t teaches the 
whole people by i t s example. . . . If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, i t breeds 
contempt for law; i t i nv i t e s every man to 
become a law unto himself; i t i n v i t e s anarchy. 
In t h a t same case, Jus t ice Holmes wrote in h i s d issent ing 
opinion: 
We have to choose, and for my par t I think 
i t l e s s evil that some criminals should 
escape than t h a t the Government should play 
an ignoble pa r t . 
277 U.S. a t 470. 
Although some courts continue to recognize the j ud i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y r a t iona le as the most compelling j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
exclusionary ru le , s e e . e .g . . State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. 
Super, a t 244, 491 A.2d a t 45, i t i s subject to the same a t tack 
as i s the personal r ight r a t i o n a l e — i . e . , there appears to be no 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for i t , e i ther t ex tua l ly or h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Stewart, supra at 1383. H i s to r i ca l ly , courts have in a var ie ty 
of circumstances admitted i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence, apparently 
not overly concerned t h a t to do so would necessar i ly involve the 
court in "dir ty bus iness ." Ib id , x Stone v. Powellf 428 U.S. 465, 
486 (1976) (observing t h a t the fourth amendment "has never been 
in te rp re ted to proscribe the in t roduct ion of i l l e g a l l y seized 
evidence in a l l proceedings or against a l l persons") ; Coe, supra 
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a t 17. This c r i t i c i sm appears sound, and although there i s a 
good deal of merit to the value judgment inherent in the jud ic ia l 
i n t e g r i t y doctr ine , i t does not provide a sound const i tu t ional 
bas is for the exclusionary r u l e . Indeed, the j ud i c i a l i n t e g r i t y 
r a t i o n a l e was e x p l i c i t l y rejected as an independent 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for the exclusionary rule by the Supreme 
Court in Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 450 n. 25 (1974). The 
t ex t and his tory of a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14 demand no dif ferent 
conclusion by t h i s Court. 
The deterrence r a t iona le i s with l i t t l e doubt the most 
widely accepted j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary r u l e . In 
Leon, the Supreme Court made clear that i t perceived deterrence 
as the only purpose for the r u l e . 468 U.S. a t 906. Numerous 
s t a t e courts have taken a similar posi t ion regarding t he i r own 
exclusionary r u l e s . See, e .g . , Mers v. Statue. 482 N.E.2d 778, 
782-83 (Ind. App. 1985); S ta te v. Wood, 457 So.2d 206, 210-11 
(La. App. 1984); S ta te v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 
674, 67b-/y (1981), ce r t , denied, 454 U.S. }057 (recognizing 
t ha t , although other reasons for i t s use ex^st , the primary 
purpose of Idaho1 s exclusionary rule i s t o deter police 
misconduct). The Leon decision and a number of s t a t e court 
opinions, e .g . State v. Brown, 708 So.2d a t 146; Str inger v. 
S t a t e , 491 So.2d 837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J . , 
concurr ing) , ref lec t the majority, and probably bet ter reasoned, 
view tha t the deterrence r a t i ona l e , l i k e th£ other r a t i ona l e s , 
has no readi ly d i scern ib le basis in the federal cons t i tu t ion or 
the s t a t e cons t i t u t i ons . On the other hand, J u s t i c e Potter 
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Stewart has a r t i c u l a t e d what i s perhaps the most compelling 
counterargument to tha t view: 
To give effect t o the C o n s t i t u t i o n s prohi-
b i t ion against i l l e g a l searches and s e i zu re s , 
i t may be necessary for the judic iary to 
remove the incent ive for v io l a t i ng i t . Thus, 
i t may be argued tha t although the Consti tu-
tion does not e x p l i c i t l y provide for exclu-
sion, the need to enforce the Cons t i t u t i on ' s 
l i m i t s on government—to preserve the rule 
of law—requires an exclusionary ru le . Under 
t h i s th i rd "doc t r ina l" bas is for the exclu-
sionary rule , which has been described as 
"cons t i tu t iona l common law," the exclusion of 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly obtained evidence i s not 
a cons t i tu t iona l r ight but a cons t i tu t iona l 
remedy. I t i s a r ight only in the sense 
tha t every remedy ves t s a r ight in those 
who may claim i t . 
Stewart, supra at 1384. But even he qua l i f i ed h i s argument by 
s ta t ing : 
Under such an approach, the determination 
whether the exclusionary ru le i s cons t i tu -
t i ona l ly required turns on whether there are 
other adequate remedies avai lable to ensure 
tha t the government does not v io l a t e the 
fourth amendment a t i t s p leasure . 
I b i d . 
Assuming t h a t t h i s Court i s among those courts t h a t see 
deterrence of pol ice misconduct as the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary ru le , a reasonable assumption given i t s recent 
adoption of Rule 12(g) (which, as discussed in more de t a i l below, 
i s a de ter rence-or iented , modified exclusionary r u l e ) , the Court 
should e x p l i c i t l y hold tha t an exclusionary r u l e , in any form, i s 
not required e i the r by a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14, or any other 
provision in the s t a t e cons t i t u t ion , on a theory tha t exclusion 
i s a cons t i tu t iona l remedy premised upon the deterrence doct r ine . 
Although J u s t i c e S tewar t ' s cons t i tu t iona l theory regarding the 
- 3 4 -
deterrence r a t iona le i s not without some force, by adopting i t 
the Court would unnecessarily entangle i t s e l f in a l e s s than 
clear cons t i tu t iona l ana lys is . Elevating a question in to the 
realm of a cons t i tu t iona l quest ion, when tqa t i s avoidable, i s 
not the preferred course. See State v. Woqd, 648 P.2d 71, 82 
(Utah 1982), c e r t , denied, 459 U.S. 988. ^he preferable course 
for t h i s Court would be to do as the Supreme Court did in Leon 
and recognize tha t t h i s s t a t e ' s exclusionaijy rule—which i s 
embodied in Rule 12(g)—operates as a j ud i c i a l l y created remedy 
designed to safeguard a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14 r igh t s through i t s 
deterrent ef fect , rather than a personal cons t i tu t iona l r ight of 
the aggrieved person. See Leon, 468 U.S. dt 906. Under t h i s 
approach, future modifications of Rule 12(g) , including the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t o t a l l y abandoning exclusion of evidence as a 
remedy for search-and-seizure v io l a t i ons , c|re more easi ly 
analyzed and adopted.13 
Final ly , although the Court might also embrace the 
j ud i c i a l i n t eg r i t y ra t iona le as an addi t ional nonconst i tut ional 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary rule , see , e. g. , Johnson, 716 
P.2d a t 1298, tha t would not be completely consis tent with the 
tenor of Rule 12(g) , which allows the admission of i l l e g a l l y 
obtained evidence so long as the v io la t ion was insubs tan t ia l and 
committed in good f a i t h . In short , of the three tha t have been 
13 For ins tance, if the Court were to conclude at some future 
date tha t adequate a l t e rna t i ve remedies to the exclusionary ru le 
e x i s t , i t could simply abandon the rule through i t s rule-making 
function without having to explain why a rijle once required by 
the s t a t e cons t i tu t ion was no longer so required. 
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discussed , the deterrence ra t iona le , viewed as a 
nonconst i tut ional doctr ine , provides the c l e a r e s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the exclusionary rule contained in Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
Having addressed the quest ion of whether an 
exclusionary rule i s required under e i ther the fourth amendment 
or a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 14, the next quest ion i s whether Rule 12(g) 
i s a permiss ible remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of a defendant's r i g h t s 
under the federal and s ta te prov i s ions . Because a s t a t e i s free 
t o fashion whatever rule i t des i re s concerning v i o l a t i o n s of i t s 
s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provis ion that are not a l so v i o l a t i o n s of 
the fourth amendment, the ana lys i s of t h i s i s sue w i l l focus on 
whether Rule 12(g) provides a permiss ible remedy for v i o l a t i o n s 
of the fourth amendment. By proceeding in t h i s way, the State i s 
assuming that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , b e l i e v e s i t to 
be an acceptable rule under s t a t e law for v i o l a t i o n s of a r t i c l e 
I, s ec t i on 14. Thus, if the Court were to determine that certa in 
po l i ce conduct v i o l a t e d a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 even though i t did 
not v i o l a t e the fourth amendment, presumably Rule 12(g) would be 
the c o n t r o l l i n g rule on the issue of suppression. 
Under the Mapp ru l ing , as modified by Leon, the 
individual s t a t e s are obl igated t o apply the federal exclusionary 
rule in cases of a fourth amendment v i o l a t i o n . If federal law 
requires exc lus ion under the f a c t s presented, the s t a t e court 
oust exclude the evidence. In short , a s t a t e may not have a more 
narrow exclusionary rule than the federal rule when a fourth 
amendment v i o l a t i o n i s at i s s u e . Str inger v. S t a t e . 491 So.2d at 
847 (Robertson, J . , concurring) . Therefore, i t must be 
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determined whether Rule 12(g) , which obviously a p p l i e s t o 
v i o l a t i o n s of the four th amendment, can be Applied in a manner 
c o n s i s t e n t with federa l law. 
Rule 12(g) appears t o be a hybr id r u l e which combines 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t suggested by the American Law I n s t i t u t e 
i n i t s MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975) , see 
g e n e r a l l y Coe, sup ra , and the good f a i t h excep t ion t o the 
exc lus ionary r u l e a r t i c u l a t e d by the Suprem4 Court in Leon 
(warrant con tex t ) and the F i f th C i r c u i t Coutft of Appeals in 
United S t a t e s v . Wil l iams, 622 F.2d 830 (5t^ C i r . 1980) , c e r t , 
den ied , 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (wa r r an t l e s s c o n t e x t ) . I t r e f l e c t s 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with au tomat ic exc lus ion (wfriich does not consider 
what d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t , if any, exc lu s ion w i | l have in the given 
case) as t h e remedy for every search-and-se i jzure v i o l a t i o n , the 
c o s t s of which can be extremely h igh . Leoni 468 U.S. a t 907-08; 
Stone v . Powel l , 428 U.S. a t 490 ("The d i s p a r i t y in p a r t i c u l a r 
cases between the e r ro r committed by the p o l i c e o f f i c e r and the 
w ind fa l l afforded a g u i l t y defendant by a p p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e 
i s con t ra ry t o t h e idea of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y ^hat i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
t he concept of j u s t i c e . " ) ; Schroeder , supra a t 1424-25 
(summarizing the perce ived c o s t s of the exc lus iona ry r u l e as 
f o l l ows : "(1) f o s t e r i n g delay in t h e systeii of j u s t i c e ; (2) 
i 
encouraging p o l i c e p e r j u r y ; (3) d i v e r t i n g t^e a t t e n t i o n of the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s in a c r iminal case from the qu0s t i on of g u i l t or 
innocence ; (4) f r e e i n g the g u i l t y ; and (5) gene ra t i ng d i s r e s p e c t 
for t h e law and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e by g r a n t i n g 
windfa l l b e n e f i t s t o c e r t a i n g u i l t y defendants" ( foo tnote 
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c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ) . Instead, i t re ta ins exc lus ion as a remedy 
for a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n , recognizing that a 
bene f i c ia l deterrent e f f e c t i s r e a l i z e d through exclus ion only 
under appropriate circumstances. Thus, Rule 12(g) embraces a 
p r i n c i p l e that was central to the dec i s ion in Leon: avoidance of 
the high c o s t s of the exclusionary rule where exc lus ion would not 
e f f e c t i v e l y deter po l i ce misconduct. As s tated in Leon: 
[Elven assuming that the rule e f f e c t i v e l y 
de ters some po l ice misconduct and provides 
i n c e n t i v e s for the law enforcement profess ion 
as a whole to conduct i t s e l f in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, i t cannot be expected, 
and should not be appl ied, to deter object -
ive ly reasonable law enforcement a c t i v i t y . 
468 U.S. at 918-19. £ £ . Stewart, supra at 1394 n. 155; Oaks, 
•Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Se izure ," 37 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 665 ( 1 9 7 0 ) — c r i t i c s of the exclusionary rule who 
f o r c e f u l l y argue that i t does not in fact deter unconst i tut ional 
po l i ce conduct. Addi t iona l ly , because the rule operates in 
conjunction with UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-16-1 through -11 (Supp. 
1986) , which provide a c i v i l remedy for the defendant whose 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights have been v i o l a t e d , 1 4 i t s mandate for 
l i m i t e d exc lus ion i s cons i s tent with the wel l reasoned view that , 
if adequate a l t e r n a t i v e remedies e x i s t , exc lus ion becomes l e s s 
necessary. See Bivens v . Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J. , d i s sent ing) (out l in ing 
an a l t e r n a t i v e remedial scheme to the exclusionary r u l e ) . 
1* An aggrievea defendant could a l so seek damages from the pol ice 
o t f i c e r under the federal Civ i l Rights Act , 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
(1982) . 
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Although the language of Rule 12(d) does not precisely 
track the good fa i th exception a r t i cu l a t ed in Leon and Williams, 
the g is t of Utah's subs tant ia l i ty /good fa i th rule i s the same as 
that set out in those cases ; and t h i s Court, through case law, 
can ensure tha t i t i s applied in a manner consistent with federal 
law.15 p o r ins tance , in Leon the Court a t 0ne point s ta ted in 
reference to appl ica t ion of the exclusionary ru le : 
Pa r t i cu la r ly when law enforcement off icers 
have acted in objective good fa i th or the i r 
t ransgress ions have been minor , the magnitude 
of the benefit conferred on such gui l ty defen-
dants offends basic concepts of t^ie criminal j u s t i c e system. 
468 U.S. at 907-08 (c i t ing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490) 
(emphasis added). I t further noted: 
The Court has, to be sure, not seriously ques-
tioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued appl icat ion of the ru le 
to suppress evidence from the [prosecution 's] 
case where a Fourth Amendment v io la t ion has 
been subs tan t ia l and del iberate* • . . " Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1^78); Stone v. 
Powell, supra f a t 492. 
15 Some of the quest ions t ha t were asked the S t a t e ' s counsel 
during oral argument in S ta te v. Mendoza, Case No. 20922 (argued 
June 12, 1986), suggest t ha t cer ta in members of the Court may not 
be e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d with the language of Rule 12(g) . However, 
i t i s the Court ' s ru l e , and if the ru le i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
worded, the Court should amend i t . Aware of the possible 
concerns in t h i s regard, a t torneys from the Attorney General 's 
Otfice plan t o meet with represen ta t ives from the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutors and other members of the law 
enforcement community to discuss Rule 12(g) and perhaps pe t i t i on 
for a rule change, as the S ta te has done with respect to Utah R. 
Crim. P. 27 (see In Re: Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, S t a t e ' s Pe t i t i on for Amendment to Rule (f i led February 
19 , 1986)). If such a pe t i t i on i s f i l e d , the S ta te wi l l a t that 
same time submit a complete memorandum discussing the 
exclusionary ru le and possible a l t e rna t i ve s to i t . But for now, 
the S ta te recognizes t h a t the Court has adopted current Rule 
12(g) , and therefore wi l l l im i t i t s discussion here t o the legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for tha t ru l e . 
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Id . at 908-09 (emphasis added). See also McFarland v. S t a t e , 284 
Ark. 533, 549, 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1985) (c i t ing Leon with 
approval in applying Arkansas 's subs tan t ia l v io la t ion ru le for 
suppression of evidence (A.R. Cr.P. 16.2(e)—a rule patterned 
after the ALI's s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t ) ) . 
Furthermore, tha t the Supreme Court has not 
spec i f i ca l l y held t h a t the Leon good fa i th exception would apply 
in a warrant less context , as Rule 12(g) obviously would, the 
Cour t ' s general discussion in tha t case about the propriety of a 
good fa i th exception strongly suggests that such an extension of 
Leon would be both acceptable and des i rab le . See 468 U.S. at 
918-19. 
Some courts have adopted a form of good fa i th exception 
to the exclusionary ru le in a warrant less search or seizure 
context . See, e .g . , United S ta t e s v. Wyler, 502 F.Supp. 969, 
973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The leading case i s s t i l l Williams where 
the Fifth Circui t held t h a t evidence seized from the defendant 
incident t o a warrant less a r r e s t , which was ul t imately determined 
to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because "evidence 
i s not to be suppressed under the exclusionary ru le where i t i s 
discovered by of f icers in the course of act ions t h a t are taken in 
good fa i th and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that 
they are author izea . " 622 F.2d a t 840. The court analyzed the 
appropr ia teness of a good fa i th exception in much the same way 
that the Supreme Court did in ^eon, emphasizing t h a t the 
de ter rent purpose of the exclusionary ru le i s not fur thered if 
the ru le i s applied t o s i t ua t i ons where police of f icers have 
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ac t ed i n t h e good f a i t h be l i e f t h a t t h e i r conduct i s l awfu l . 622 
F.2d a t 842. Numerous c o u r t s have c i t e d Wil l iams with app rova l . 
E .g . United S t a t e s v . Cot ton . 751 F.2d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (10th Ci r . 
1985); ppnpyfln y, Federal Clear ing Pie tasting C p t , 695 F.2d 
1020 f 1023-24 (7th C i r . 1982); United S t a t e s v . Nolan. 530 
P.Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981) , a f f ' d . 718 F.2d 589 (3d C i r . 
1983); S t a t e v . Verkuvlen. 120 Wis.2d 59 , 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 
App. 1982) ; S t a t e v. G l a s s . 9 Ohio Misc.2d 10 , 1 1 , 458 N.E.2d 
1302, 1304 (Ohio Com. P I . 1983 ) . In s h o r t , t he Wil l iams opinion 
embodies t he l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n of Leon i n t o the area of 
w a r r a n t l e s s s ea rches and s e i z u r e s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o conceive 
of any compell ing reason why the Supreme Court would not apply 
t h e Leon r u l e in a case where an o f f i c e r ' s w a r r a n t l e s s conduct, 
subsequent ly determined to be i n v i o l a t i o n of the f o u r t h 
amendment, was o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable under the c i rcumstances . 
See I . N . S . v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1032, 1055-56 (1984) 
(White, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ; People v . Deitchm^n, 695 P.2d 1146, 1153 
(Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C . J . , concurr ing) (observing t h a t 
C o l o r a d o ' s s t a t u t o r y "good fa i th 1 1 except ioi i t o t h e exc lus ionary 
r u l e i s c o n s i s t e n t wi th fou r th amendment precedent and does not 
v i o l a t e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s ) ; Bloom, "United S t a t e s 
v. Leon And I t s R a m i f i c a t i o n s , " 56 Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 
(1985) . But see United S t a t e s v . Whit ing. 781 F.2d 692, 698-99 
(9th C i r . 1986) ( r e fus ing t o extend Leon r a t i o n a l e t o w a r r a n t l e s s 
s i t u a t i o n ) ; Greenhalgh, "The War ran t l e s s Good Fa i th Exception— 
Unprecedented, I n d e f e n s i b l e , and Devoid of N e c e s s i t y , • 26 S. Tex. 
L . J . 129 (1985) . 
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Fina l ly , although i t does not bear on the federal 
cons t i tu t iona l i s sue and r e l a t e s only t o the appropriateness of 
Rule 12(g) under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n (which, as noted e a r l i e r , 
should not be an i s s u e in that the Court, by adopting Rule 12 (g ) , 
presumably b e l i e v e s that the rule does not create any s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems), i t i s worth noting that a number of 
courts have adopted the Leon good f a i t h exception as part of 
their s t a t e exclusionary r u l e . S ta te v. Brown, 708 So.2d at 145-
46; Mers v. S t a t e , 482 N.E.2d at 782-83; McFarland v . S t a t e , 284 
Ark. at 549, 684 S.W.2d at 243; S ta te v. Wood, 457 So.2d at 210-
11; S ta te v. Bo l t , 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984) . But see 
People v. Bigelow, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451 , 457-
58 (1985); S ta te v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 
(1985); S ta te v. Houston, 359 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 1984) — 
cases r e j e c t i n g Leon on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds. 
Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion and the probable 
cause a n a l y s i s se t forth in subsect ion A, the t r i a l court should 
not have excluded the challenged evidence under Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
There simply was no showing that Caz ier f s search pursuant to a 
warrant cons t i tu ted a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n of 
defendant's r i g h t s . The warrant i ssued e i ther was supported by 
probable cause (thus no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n when Cazier 
executed i t ) , or i f determined to be i n v a l i d due to the technical 
inadequacy of Cazier1 s a f f i d a v i t , was reasonably r e l i e d upon by 
the o f f i cer who, under an objec t ive reasonableness t e s t , had no 
bas i s for be l i ev ing that the warrant was i n v a l i d . See DTAH CODE 
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